Conflict Management in the Post-Cold War Era: Preventive Diplomacy and PKO

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Abstract

This article is an empirical analysis of the cases of preventive diplomacy practiced for conflicts during the post-Cold War era. It focuses on establishing and verifying the hypotheses on the successes and failures of preventive diplomacy. For an analytical framework, it accesses the definition and theory of preventive diplomacy, along with three case studies: denuclearization of the former Soviet republics, civil war in East Timor, and the North Korean nuclear crisis.

This research found that the definition of the concept hardly reflects the reality and has some limitations in its application to empirical study. For this reason, it has taken preventive diplomacy as the PKO activities, which make it possible to easily collect data and clearly identify the beginning of intervention and the number of participating actors. Then it verifies the hypotheses on the successes of preventive diplomacy based on the conflict data over a 10-year period during the post-Cold War era.

For the empirical analysis, this paper selected three of Lund’s success factors—timing of intervention, support from major powers, and state autonomy—and added another factor: namely geographical region. The main findings of this paper are as follows: First, timing is a vital factor. PKO intervention was most successful at the latent level of conflict. Second, intervention of major powers is also significant. The intervention of the United States yielded a high rate of success. Third, state autonomy is not a critical factor. Domestic and international conflicts showed no differences in the success of PKO. Fourth, geographical region proved to be an important factor.
Introduction

While conflicts at the global level have decreased since the end of the Cold War, low-intensity conflict (LIC), which is mainly related to ethnic and religious tensions and to terrorism, has increased. The world’s major powers and international organizations have attempted to prevent such conflicts from spreading, in an effort to transform the conflict zones into areas of greater peace and security. Such attempts include confidence-building measures, arms reduction and control, preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peace-building, and crisis management.

Preventive diplomacy has been adopted by the United States in response to the UN’s call for it in conflict management in the post-Cold War era. In 1994, the Clinton administration presented a report entitled National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, referring to democracy, economic assistance, overseas military stationing, security cooperation, and multilateral arrangement, as effective measures of preventive diplomacy. After the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration emphasized preventive diplomacy aimed at terrorism and the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and strengthened cooperation with the UN and other international organizations. The combined efforts of major powers, international organizations and NGOs have made preventive diplomacy the core security concept for international peace and conflict resolution.

There exist various interpretations and theoretical formulations of preventive diplomacy. This article will provide an empirical analysis of the cases of preventive diplomacy practiced for conflicts during the post-Cold War era. The authors will establish and verify the hypotheses on the successes and failures of preventive diplomacy, with the article structured as follows.

The first section reviews the definition, components and instruments of preventive diplomacy, revealing the types of preventive diplomacy and the preconditions for its successful implementation.

The second section considers several cases to examine the applicability of the previously discussed definition and theory of preventive diplomacy. These case studies make it possible to modify the established hypotheses and develop new hypotheses. Three cases, varying
in character and place of origin, will be examined. These include the
denuclearization of the former Soviet republics, civil war in East Timor,
and the North Korean nuclear crisis of the early 1990s. These three
cases are elaborately selected in two aspects. First, they represent the
most turbulent and geographically-varied regions, namely Eastern
Europe (Ukraine, Belarus), Central Asia (Kazakhstan), Northeast Asia
(North Korea) and Southeast Asia (East Timor). Second, the three cases
are located at different points on the spectrum of success and failure.
The case for the former Soviet republics shows the ideal type of preven-
tive diplomacy, while the case of East Timor is ambivalent in the evalu-
ation of success and failure. These case studies provide important theo-
retical implications to preventive diplomacy.

The third section verifies the hypotheses on the success of preven-
tive diplomacy based on conflict data over a 10-year period during the
post-Cold War era. The World Warwatch (WOWW) database of the
Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) and the Peacekeeping
Operations (PKO) documents of the UN are used as sources of data for
statistical analysis. The KIDA data helps list the violent conflicts that
have occurred after the end of the Cold War, while the documents on
PKO provide details about the international PKO activities. This paper
regards PKO as an indicator for preventive diplomacy. Even though
PKO is mostly implemented following violent conflicts, it still performs
the function of preventing conflicts from further spreading or escalat-
ing. PKO is considered the best available indicator to apply preventive
diplomacy. The conditions under which preventive diplomacy is suc-
cessful in resolving conflicts are examined by cross tabulation analysis.

**Preventive Diplomacy**

*The Concept of Preventive Diplomacy*

The term “preventive diplomacy” was first coined in 1960 by then
UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, in a Cold War context. He
described preventive diplomacy as “UN efforts undertaken in cases of
localized disputes and wars that might provoke wider confrontations
between the two superpowers.”¹
Thirty-two years later, after the end of the Cold War, the concept of preventive diplomacy received much more explicit attention. In his report, “Agenda for Peace,” in 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali described preventive diplomacy as:

Action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.²

Following Boutros-Ghali’s conceptualization of preventive diplomacy in 1992, academics and security analysts have attempted to refine the concept and identify the possible tools of preventive diplomacy. Michael S. Lund contends that Boutros-Ghali’s definition of preventive diplomacy requires a focus, narrower than that given in the 1992 report.³ Lund defines preventive diplomacy as:

Action taken in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political, and international change.⁴

With regard to the stage of the conflict cycle, Bruce W. Jentleson criticizes Boutros-Ghali’s broad definition, and distinguishes between the stages of prevention and conflict management. Jentleson argues that Boutros-Ghali’s “focus is on the period in which violence is imminent or early but still short of mass, deadly conflict—i.e., going not too far back and not too far forward.”⁵

3 Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts, p. 36.
4 Ibid., p. 37.
5 Bruce W. Jentleson, “Preventive Diplomacy: A Conceptual and Analytic
In addition, the Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict regards preventive diplomacy as one of the means of “operational prevention [measures applicable in the face of immediate crisis].” The Report characterizes preventive diplomacy as follows:

When crisis threatens, traditional diplomacy continues, but more urgent efforts are also made—through unilateral and multilateral channels—to pressure, cajole, arbitrate, mediate, or lend ‘good offices’ to encourage dialogue and facilitate a nonviolent resolution of the crisis.\(^6\)

Michael Lund, one of the most enthusiastic supporters of preventive diplomacy, criticizes Boutros-Ghali’s definition as being “too inclusive,” arguing that “it blurs significant operational distinctions among the interventions made at different stages of conflicts.”\(^7\) In this sense, advocates of preventive diplomacy maintain that the conceptual core of preventive diplomacy is a critical approach seeking to resolve disputes before large-scale violence breaks out. David Hamburg states that:

The core premise of preventive diplomacy is that international security is today better served by working proactively to avert outbreaks of large-scale violence, state collapse, terrorism, and weapons proliferation than it is by simply reacting to crises once they have occurred.\(^8\)

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Measures and Factors of Effective Preventive Diplomacy

With regard to the measures of preventive diplomacy, as long as preventive diplomacy in essence means preemptive timing of actions at the pre-violent stage of conflicts, most scholars do not restrict the techniques or methods of intervention.9

In his 1992 report, Boutros-Ghali suggests that measures of preventive diplomacy include confidence-building measures, early warning, fact-finding missions, preventive deployment, and demilitarized zones.10 Lund also emphasizes diplomatic, political, military, economic, judicial-legal, and other methods and policies as various measures of preventive diplomacy.11 Jentleson focuses on mixed strategies including both inducements and coercive elements.12

The Carnegie Commission articulates four factors contributing to successful preventive diplomacy: maintaining open and high-fidelity lines of communication, expressing the interests in jeopardy in a clear and compelling manner, implementing the agenda of the UN Security Council or of the relevant international organization, and pursuing quiet diplomacy and dialogue.13

Furthermore, Lund elaborates on the most comprehensive factors for successful preventive diplomacy: third-party timing, multifaceted action, support from major players, moderate leadership, and state autonomy. First, early third-party involvement is vital for preventive diplomacy to succeed. Second, multifaceted action, including “carrots” and/or “sticks” and a variety of actions and instruments, is important for effective preventive diplomacy. Third, peaceful outcomes are more likely when dominant powers support or tolerate active preventive efforts. Fourth, moderate leadership of disputing groups further raises the possibilities for successful preventive diplomacy. Finally, prospects for peaceful outcomes are markedly enhanced by the existence of an autonomous state that possesses a strong constitutional order and

13 Carnegie Commission, Preventing Deadly Conflict, p. xxiii.
neutral security and military forces.\textsuperscript{14}

This study on preventive diplomacy follows two directions. First, the mentioned conceptual frameworks will be applied to the specific case studies to evaluate their applicability to reality. Based upon the test results, theoretical modifications will be suggested. Second, Lund’s five factors for successful preventive diplomacy will be applied to the case studies to examine the conflict management capability of preventive diplomacy in the post-Cold War era.

\section*{The Theory of Preventive Diplomacy in Practice}

\textit{Denuclearization of the Former Soviet Republics}

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990, more than 6,000 nuclear warheads, including 3,200 strategic nuclear weapons, were being deployed in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Of these countries, Ukraine possessed as many as 4,000 warheads, more than the total number that France, Great Britain and China possessed as a whole, and was ranked the world’s third nuclear power.\textsuperscript{15} The dissolution of the Soviet Union brought about a nuclear crisis in several aspects.

First, the Non-Proliferation regime, which had previously been effective, fell under pressure. Signatory states in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) had agreed to decide 25 years after the conclusion of the treaty in 1970 whether or not the NPT should be extended.\textsuperscript{16} As the significant year of 1995 approached, the member states were confronting the problem of nuclear proliferation that had resulted as a consequence of the Soviet Union’s collapse. Second, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I) was also challenged. Bush and Gorbachev had agreed on nuclear disarmament in 1991, but this treaty was undermined by the division of the Soviet Union into several sovereign states. Russia claimed

\textsuperscript{14} Lund, \textit{Preventing Violent Conflicts}, pp. 85–103.
that it would dismantle the weapons stationed in the former Soviet republics to satisfy the quota agreement for reducing the Soviet proportion. Third, the international community was concerned about whether the former Soviet republics could control their possession of weapons and fissile materials during their transitional period of social disorder and economic hardship, where WMD could fall into the hands of criminals or terrorist groups. Lastly, Russia was in a state of tension with the former Soviet republics, especially Ukraine in the dispute over the Krym peninsula and the Black Sea fleet. The region began to be perceived as the “Balkan armed with nuclear weapons.”

In order to overcome the crisis of nuclear proliferation in the region, the United States and Russia made great efforts to denuclearize the former Soviet republics. Their efforts were met with success. With the transfer of the last remaining nuclear weapons from Lida in Belarus to Russia in 1996, the region became a non-nuclear zone. The case of denuclearization of the former Soviet Union is a success story of preventive diplomacy and meets the five prerequisites for success presented by Lund. First and foremost, the timing of intervention was early enough to bring a successful outcome. Shortly after the failed putsch of the conservatives against Gorbachev in August 1991, U.S. President Bush initiated the withdrawal of short-range U.S. missiles deployed in Western European countries, and urged Russia to reciprocally withdraw its nuclear weapons from the former Soviet republics. Bush’s initiative was supported by the Nunn-Lugar program that sanctioned the budget for the storage, transportation, and dismantling of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet republics. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan were successfully persuaded to sign the Lisbon agreement, in terms of which the three countries were to transfer their nuclear weapons to Russia and enter the NPT.

In terms of multifaceted action, the United States employed at least three diverse instruments, which included a security guarantee, financial compensation, and financial assistance. As well as inviting Ukraine to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, the United States

offered provisions for security by helping Ukraine establish its new military structure independent from Soviet forces, and by beginning joint-military exercises with the new Ukrainian forces. Regarding the security guarantee for Ukraine, the heads of the three depository governments of the NPT, the United States, the U.K. and Russia gathered in Moscow in 1994, and concluded a memorandum. The United States compensated Ukraine for renouncing its nuclear weapons, and agreed to purchase the fissile material of up to 500 tons that Russia was supposed to extract from the weapons. With this agreement, Ukraine could expect a financial gain from its decision of denuclearization.\(^{18}\) The United States provided assistance for the dismantling of weapons, with the Nunn-Lugar program spending an annual budget of US$400 million to provide housing for the former missile base officers and containers and protection devices for the transportation of the nuclear weapons and fissile materials.\(^{19}\)

The crucial factor for successful denuclearization was the active support of the United States as it took the most interest in resolving the issue. Following the end of Cold War, the security threat for the United States at the global level disappeared, and only the threats at the regional and national level remained. Nuclear proliferation in the region raised U.S. concerns about the possible reemergence of a threat at the global level. These concerns induced the U.S. administration to give top priority to addressing both the careless management of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet republics and international terrorism of a disastrous scale.\(^{20}\)

Two additional internal factors can be considered in addition to the abovementioned external factors for successful preventive diplomacy. First, the leaders of the former Soviet republics displayed, on the whole, moderation in their views and actions. Belarus was the most cooperative state toward the efforts for denuclearization. Similar to Russia in ethnicity and culture, Belarus has few concerns about a security threat from Russia. Kazakhstan also demonstrated a relatively cooperative stance. Nazarbaev, the first President of Kazakhstan, requested

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U.S. support in transferring the huge amount of fissile material found in Kazakhstan to a safe place of storage. As the first project of the Nunn-Lugar program, “Operation Sapphire” made possible the transportation of the fissile material in Ust-Komenogorsk to Oak Ridge in the United States.

The crux of the issue was Ukraine. The Ukrainian parliament rejected the Lisbon agreement because many lawmakers argued that Ukraine needed to maintain its nuclear status, especially given the potential threat from Russia. Moreover, President Kravchuk gradually lost his political authority and faced difficulties in persuading the hardliners in question. Under this situation, the United States allowed Ukraine to take a non-activation measurement as a step toward nuclear dismantlement. So in the Ukrainian case, the implementation of nuclear dismantlement was finally possible following the period of detachment of warheads from missiles.

The second internal factor for the success of denuclearization was the sovereignty of the negotiating partner. Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan came to obtain their sovereignty simultaneously with the breakdown of the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union had collapsed in disorder without breaking into sovereign states, the United States could not have found legitimate partners for the negotiation. In principle, it is very difficult to impose disarmament upon a foreign state. More difficult is the disarmament of a state that has no authoritative central power over even conventional weapons, as shown by the cases of Bosnia and Rwanda.

North Korean Nuclear Issue (1993–94)

Although North Korea signed the NPT in 1985, it did not sign the required International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguard Agreement until 1992. In response to the IAEA’s demands for special inspections, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT, effective three months from the date of the announcement on March 12, 1993. On April 1, the IAEA subsequently declared that North Korea was not adhering to its safeguards agreement. The UN Security Council, on May 11, urged North Korea to remain in the NPT and encouraged the United States to initiate bilateral talks with North
Korea.

Under these circumstances, the first round of U.S.-DPRK talks was held on June 2–11 in New York, where North Korea agreed to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT. During the second round of U.S.-DPRK negotiations in Geneva on July 11–18, the idea of a light-water reactor was officially raised by the North Korean delegation. Moreover, the idea of a package deal was raised for the first time. In fact, the United States began to prepare for a “comprehensive solution” for resolving North Korea’s nuclear program since the late fall of 1993, and North Korea also publicly reaffirmed on November 11, 1993, its interest in a “package deal.”

Following these developments, on February 25, 1994, the United States and North Korea announced the “Agreed Conclusion,” designed to reinitiate IAEA monitoring and inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities, and to initiate the third round of U.S.-DPRK talks. However, during the following period of April and May, North Korea began to unload its plutonium-laden spent fuel. This led to the most acute crisis in U.S.-North Korean relations, with the Clinton administration seeking approval from the UN Security Council for the imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea. In addition, the United States strengthened its deterrent military postures on the Korean peninsula in order to signal its firm resolve toward North Korea and prepare for a contingency situation. In response to the coercive actions of the United States, North Korea warned that such a move could precipitate North Korean military actions.

While pressures of U.S. military preparations and economic sanctions against North Korea increased, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter arrived in Pyongyang on June 15, 1994, where he managed to persuade Kim Il Sung to freeze North Korea’s nuclear program and

resume bilateral talks with the United States. Following Carter’s visit, the third round of U.S.-DPRK talks were held, and the outlines of a package deal began to take shape. The United States and North Korea finally signed an “Agreed Framework” on October 21, 1994, which mapped out the reciprocal steps toward resolving the nuclear issue.24

Based on Lund’s five factors for successful preventive diplomacy, the North Korean case presents several implications and lessons. First, in terms of third-party timing of intervention, between March 1993 and October 1994, efforts were repeatedly made by the IAEA, UN, China, and others to resolve the nuclear impasse through negotiations.25 From the early stage of intervention, international organizations such as the IAEA particularly played an important role in resolving the North Korean nuclear problem as increasingly assertive actors in international conflict management.26

Second, as for multifaceted action, the United States employed political and economic inducements that were the most effective tools in encouraging North Korean cooperation. Besides diplomatic action, the United States also employed coercive measures against North Korea—namely the threat of economic sanctions and military force.27 However, the threat of military force was used as a supplementary element in a bargaining strategy that focused mainly on economic instruments to counter the North Korean nuclear program.28 In addition, the military threat played solely a supporting role in addressing the North Korean nuclear issue, and did not reveal the multilateral aspect. The neighboring regional powers hardly made any important contributions in the whole process of tackling the issue.

Third, in terms of support from major global and regional powers, there existed a clear consensus among the major players. The United

24 Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, pp. 68–69.
25 Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws, p. 139.
States, China, Russia, and Japan all supported the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and sought a peaceful solution to the North Korean nuclear issue. In particular, the United States effectively coordinated international action with China, Russia, and Japan. Moreover, China, in strong opposition to nuclear proliferation in the region, urged the United States and North Korea to resolve the nuclear impasse by means of negotiations.

Fourth, with regard to moderate leadership, although the Clinton administration employed mixed strategies combining carrots and sticks, we can argue that the U.S. approach focused more heavily on carrots than on sticks. However, the most distinctive characteristic of North Korea’s bargaining behavior was brinkmanship and hostile rhetoric. Although North Korea maintained its hostility against the United States and South Korea, it sought to manipulate the situation in order to maximize the possibility of receiving concessions and increase its own bargaining leverage against the United States.

Finally, with respect to state autonomy, the level of flexibility at the bargaining table was limited by the rigidity of North Korea’s Stalinist institutional structure and the weak authority of the bargaining team. However, as a factor contributing to preventive diplomacy, North Korea’s tradition of strong, independent central governmental institutions with control over North Korean security and military affairs was an important benefit. Due to the North Korean top leader’s dominant role in the negotiation process with the IAEA and the United States, North Korea’s bargaining approach was also highly regularized and internally consistent.

In sum, this analysis shows that the three required factors for successful preventive diplomacy—third-party timing of intervention, support from major powers, and state autonomy—may be identified in the case of the North Korean nuclear issue.

30 Ibid., p. 310.
31 Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, pp. 68, 85.
32 Ibid., p. 145.
33 Ibid., p. 43.
Separation and Independence of East Timor

In contrast to the successful denuclearization in the former Soviet republics, and the mixed results in the effect of preventive diplomacy in the North Korean nuclear crisis, the process of independence in East Timor presents a case where the theoretical hypotheses of preventive diplomacy are not easily applicable. This section aims to point out the theoretical limitations of implementing preventive diplomacy in practice, and evaluates the five success factors enumerated by Lund.\textsuperscript{34} Findings in this exercise will contribute to the theoretical improvement that is necessary for statistical research.

The Portuguese colonial government left the island of East Timor in late 1975, handing over power to the leftist faction. The seizure of the island by Indonesian military forces in 1976 marked the beginning of violent conflict between the East Timorese and the Indonesian government. In 1989, the Indonesian government opened the island to new immigrants, investors and tourists.

The first major clash was the Santa Cruz Massacre of November 1991. During a visit by Portuguese congressmen to East Timor, a peaceful memorial procession to a cemetery in Dili was performed. When this turned into a pro-independence demonstration, Indonesian troops opened fire, killing over 271 East Timorese. This massacre marked a turning point in soliciting the support of the international community for the independence of East Timor.

The second crisis was in September 1999, when Indonesian President Habibi called for a referendum for independence among the East Timorese. Immediately following the announcement, Bishop Carlos Belo, the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize co-laureate, demanded a transition period for independence, warning that the island would fall into anarchy if Indonesia were to withdraw its troops without preparation. In fact, the following eight months was a period of total anarchy, with atrocities committed by paramilitary groups. The referendum was postponed twice under the threat of paramilitary groups, and atrocities worsened after the referendum was held on August 30, 1999.

Only after the UN mandated forces led by Australian troops

\textsuperscript{34} Lund, “Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy,” pp. 379–402.
arrived on September 13, 1999, the Indonesian government announced its recognition of the need to restore order. The Indonesian rule of East Timor was terminated with the submission of the official letter transferring sovereignty to the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. On the same day, the UN Transitory Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established, and the peacekeeping force of 10,000 troops, dispatched from 16 countries, was deployed to restore domestic order.

The following lessons on preventive diplomacy can be drawn from the experience of East Timor. First, the international community failed to respond appropriately to two crisis situations and their early warnings. Only the mission performed by the UN peacekeeping force since late September 1999 can be evaluated as a successful case of preventive diplomacy. In practice, it is not easy to identify what should be an appropriate early warning at the beginning of the conflict cycle, and when should be the due time for action. This case study shows that a violent conflict provided a clear signal to the international community that it was the right time for intervention. In other words, the violent conflict might have worked as an early warning of the possible escalation and explosion of the ethnic conflict and helped to prevent the aggravation of the occasion. Theoretically speaking, PKO, which is adopted following the eruption of violent conflict, could have better applicability in analyzing preventive diplomacy.

Second, there is a more fundamental question to the warning-response gap. In the case of East Timor, the passivity of the United States can be attributed to the conflict between peace and sovereignty, in addition to the full-plate problem. Indonesia and its military had to hold under its unified sovereignty 13,000 islands and a 200 million population, divided by various languages, cultures and religions. It was necessary to send a message to the separatist movements that independence would not be possible without paying a tremendous

price. To the United States, Indonesia is an allied partner, located at a strategic point astride the key international maritime straits. These conditions raise the question of whether or not the United States should pursue its peace and human rights interests that would violate the principles of sovereignty and national interest.

We may now evaluate the validity of the five success factors of preventive diplomacy in the East Timorese case. The timing of intervention (the first factor) was not early enough to assume that intervention was preventive. The two cases of early warning were ignored, and a response occurred only when the violence became serious enough for legitimate intervention. However, when the international community took action, it was multifaceted (the second factor). The United States pressured the IMF to announce the withdrawal of monetary support programs, and Admiral Blair of the U.S. Pacific Command threatened to suspend military exchange programs between Indonesia and the United States. The Roman Catholic Church called for the dispatch of UN peacekeeping forces to East Timor, and then British Foreign Minister Robin Cook committed efforts toward dispatching British ground troops for the UN operation.

These actions demonstrate the importance of the support from major players (the third factor). While the United States did not make any contributions of personnel to the mission, it provided assistance in the form of diplomatic and economic pressure on Indonesia. The United States also provided vital logistic support, including aircraft, helicopters, intelligence, communications and a civil-military operations center, to Australia, which was leading the UN peacekeeping force.

There also existed a moderate leadership (the fourth factor). The Indonesian government adhered to the principle of dialogue and compromise even as Indonesia faced confusion under the process of democratization following its foreign exchange crisis. Even on the East Timorese side, leaders such as Gusmao and Carlos Belo denounced terrorism as a legitimate tool of protest. Finally, state autonomy (the fifth factor) was not strongly supported in this case. The Indonesian government collapsed under the pressure of reform, and even the military did not support the Habibi government.
Empirical Analysis of PKO as Preventive Diplomacy

Theoretical Modification and Hypotheses

The previous case studies provide us with some theoretical implications for the empirical study of international conflicts in the post-Cold War era. The most important lesson is on the identification of preventive diplomacy. That is, identifying what measures are taken as preventive diplomacy and what moment presents the right timing for intervention.

When disputes exacerbate to higher levels of violence in an incremental manner, it is impossible to measure the seriousness of the conflict in process. A more critical problem is that we cannot tell whether the conflict is at an early or late stage of the conflict cycle. As Menkhaus and Ortmayer explain in their study of the Somalian case, “a cascade of crisis” may occur over a long process of history.37 After the two sides involved in armed conflict reach a settlement and move toward a peacekeeping or post-conflict peace building stage, it is still possible for the conflict to reemerge and expand into another crisis situation. In this case, the peacekeeping and peace-building efforts will serve as measures of preventive diplomacy. Diplomatic intervention should be applied to the stage of unstable peace both at the beginning and at the end of the life history of a conflict. The Brahimi Report38 submitted as a report of the research panel on PKO under the direction of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, suggests that peacekeeping and post-conflict peace building should be integrated and conceived, and planned and executed as a whole, in order to promote a conflict prevention strategy.

Given this, the UN PKO presents the most institutionalized and the most objective criteria of observation as a measure of preventive diplomacy. In many cases, it is almost impossible to identify what activities comprise preventive diplomacy before the resolution of conflict, and we can draw a conclusion only after the conflict is settled. This problem


of identification limits the empirical analysis of the hypotheses on preventive diplomacy.39

The following are the rationale behind the observation of PKO as the most typical activity of preventive diplomacy. First, the repeated rise and fall in the historical cycle of conflict puts the timing of PKO, which is supposed to be implemented after the suspension of violence, at the early stage of the conflict cycle, with the task of preventing the recurrence and expansion of the conflict. Second, PKO missions provide us with systematic indicators for empirical study.40 Third, such a study can estimate the effect of PKO on conflict management rather than estimate the success or failure of PKO in performing their missions.41

The hypotheses to be tested on the conflict management capability of PKO, based upon the information of PKO mandates, are as follows.

Hypothesis 1: U.S. participation in PKO determines the success or failure of preventive diplomacy.
Hypothesis 2: The geographical region of each conflict determines the outcome of preventive diplomacy.
Hypothesis 3: Preventive diplomacy is more effective in domestic conflicts than in international conflicts.
Hypothesis 4: The type of conflict at the time of intervention determines the effectiveness of intervention.

Operationalization

Table 1 presents a summary of international conflicts in progress between 1989 and 2002. The WOWW database developed by KIDA categorizes armed conflicts into three degrees of intensity: collision, confrontation and latency. It also records the intensity of conflict for each conflict every year, so it is possible to trace the change in intensity of each conflict. From the start of small-scale armed conflict such as guerilla warfare and terrorism to the suspension of violence by armistice or cease-fire, the conflict is called Collision (C). Prior to the beginning of small-scale armed conflict, and after cease-fire or the retreat of a disputant, the conflict is called Confrontation (M). From the mounting of policy tensions to the declaration of official policy, and after the agreement of a peace treaty, the conflict is called Latency (L). Among the 80 cases of conflicts presented, the worsening of conflict by simple reversion to previous intensity of conflict, occurred innumerable times, and the transition from latency to collision is recorded for 15 cases of conflict.

The beginning and the termination of PKO missions are recorded based on the UN database of PKO missions. Operationalization of the variables is explained below. The hypotheses on preventive diplomacy are tested by cross tabulation of the variables and $\chi^2$ analysis. The statistical analysis is performed using SPSS 10.07.

(1) Dependent Variables: Success and Failure (SorF): If there is a clear improvement in the intensity of conflict, i.e. from collision (C) to either of confrontation (M), latency (L), or termination of conflict (E), the PKO mission is coded as ‘Success.’ If confrontation continues without changes in the intensity of conflict, or if the intensity worsens, the PKO mission is coded as “Failure.”

(2) Independent Variables:
- Intervention: The dispatch of U.S. troops or military analysts as participants in PKO is interpreted as intervention by the United States.
- Region: Asia, Africa, Central Asia, Europe, America and the Middle East present six regional areas of study.

– Type: All the conflicts are categorized into either “domestic” or “international.”
– Intensity: Because each conflict is coded according to the intensity of conflict for each year, we can identify the intensity of conflict at the time of intervention by PKO. If intervention occurs prior to 1989, it is coded as intervention at collision, and if it occurs after the termination of conflict, it is coded as intervention at latency.

**Results**

Since 1989, there were 44 PKO missions and 103 conflicts. PKO missions intervened in 31 conflicts (4 PKO missions in Croatia, 3 in Bosnia, 4 in Haiti, 2 in Sierra Leone, 2 in Somalia, and 4 in Angola). MINURCA, the PKO dispatched to the Central African Republic between April 1998 and February 2000, is not included in the 44 PKO missions because there is no identifiable conflict in the WOWW database.

**Table 1. Annual Fluctuations in the Intensity of Conflict for 1989–2002**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>’89</th>
<th>’90</th>
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<td>Total Conflicts</td>
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<td>84</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>97</td>
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<td>93</td>
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<tr>
<td>Confrontation</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latency</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>15</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


**Table 2. Cross Tabulation for Hypothesis 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SorF</th>
<th>Failure</th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention</td>
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<td>Intervention</td>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson $\chi^2 = 6.188$ Prob. = 0.013
U.S. Intervention

Table 2 shows that there were more successful cases when the United States intervened than when it did not intervene. The value of $\chi^2$ is 6.188, and its probability of 0.013 is much lower than the usually accepted critical value of 0.05. This means that the number of cases of success or failure as an effect of U.S. intervention clearly differs from the accidental distribution of success and failure. The accidental distribution refers to a distribution that may occur in cases where there is no relationship between U.S. intervention and SorF. The statistical result shows a correlation between the two variables, and supports Hypothesis 1.

### Table 2. Cross Tabulation for Hypothesis 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Success</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>America</td>
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<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson $\chi^2$</td>
<td>20.584</td>
<td>Prob.= 0.001</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Region of Conflict

Table 3 shows that preventive diplomacy is more likely to succeed in Europe and America than in other regions, and more likely to fail in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. The statistical results show that the probability for this distribution to occur by chance is lower than 1 percent. There can be two explanations for this phenomenon. The first is the difference in the level of nation-building and state-building. Africa has a low level of nation-building and state-building, and this situation imposes a limitation on its internal capability of problem-solving. Without domestic consensus, inter-tribal conflict and border conflict, which
have been passed on from colonial experience, cannot be resolved. Conflicts in the Middle East are also rooted in the tensions arising from border arrangements that resulted from World War I, World War II, and the establishment of Israel. For example, conflicts between Iraq and Kuwait and between Iran and Iraq start from the inter-tribal competition for new border arrangements.

On the other hand, states in Europe and America have established stable identities in the long process of history. Having developed institutional methods for international conflict resolution, this region is more conducive to preventive diplomacy.

The second explanation is that major powers play important roles in conflict resolution in Europe and America, because conflicts in these regions involve, in many cases, the vital interests of the major powers. For example, the United States would not tolerate unstable situations in Central and South America, while the United States and Western European countries had to contain the conflict in Yugoslavia and Kosovo in order to prevent its spread to other areas in Europe.

### Table 4. Region and U.S. Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Non-intervention</th>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson $\chi^2 = 8.016$  Prob. = 0.155

This leads us to the hypothesis that the frequency of U.S. intervention depends on the region of conflict. The empirical results are shown in Table 4. U.S. intervention occurred more frequently than did nonintervention in Europe and America, and occurred less frequently in Africa and the Middle East. However, this disparity in frequency is
insufficient to be of statistical significance. The result rejects the validity of the second explanation. Regional differences in the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy cannot be explained by the influence of the major powers. We can thus reach the conclusion that the first explanation regarding the region of conflict is more persuasive. Preventive diplomacy is more effective in Europe and America than in other regions due to differences in the level of nation-building and state-building.

Table 5. Cross Tabulation for Hypothesis 3

<table>
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<th>Type</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
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<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>International</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson $\chi^2 = 0.412$  
Prob. = 0.521

Types of Conflict

From Table 5, we can see that, among the conflicts in which PKO intervened, domestic conflicts occurred more frequently than international conflicts. The international community has supported non-traditional methods for resolving new types of conflicts in the post-Cold War era. However, the frequency distribution in Table 5 shows that there is no correlation between type of conflict and success of PKO. This means that PKO activities implemented as preventive diplomacy did not bring about distinctive results for the low-intensity conflicts of the post-Cold War era and for international conflicts. The low level of $\chi^2$ implies that there is no difference in the distribution of conflicts for either success or failure of PKO.

Level of Conflict at the Time of Intervention

Table 6 shows that, at the level of collision and confrontation, intervention of PKO succeeded in preventing conflicts from expanding in
seven out of 26 cases. However, all 12 interventions at the level of latency were recorded as successful because the conflicts did not continue to develop into recurrence. From this result, we can see that the level of conflict at the time of intervention has a statistically significant relationship with the success or failure of PKO as preventive diplomacy.

This result can also be interpreted to explain the limitations of the role of PKO. Skeptics may point out that the PKO’s role has been in concluding conflicts already in the termination stage. This view ignores the historical experience in which many conflicts were not terminated in a single cycle of rise and fall, and instead tended to continue over several cycles of conflict with a few fluctuations in the conflict level. Among the 103 conflicts recorded during the 1990s, 15 cases were reversed from latency to collision or confrontation. In this sense, the 12 cases of intervention at the latency stage played significant roles in preventing the recurrence of conflict. This result suggests that the conceptual framework of conflict given by Lund is too theoretical and too restrictive in application of the concept.

**Correlation among the Variables**

So far, the $\chi^2$ analyses show that U.S. intervention, the region of conflict, and the level of conflict at intervention are significant factors for the success or failure of PKO activities as preventive diplomacy. We have already confirmed that there is no statistical relationship between

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43 See Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts.*
U.S. intervention and region of conflict. We may now consider two more relationships: the relationship between level of conflict and U.S. intervention, and the relationship between region and type of conflict. Neither of the two hypotheses is supported by \( \chi^2 \) tests. Contrary to the common sense expectation that specific regions are more prone to deadly conflict, Table 7 illustrates that there is no statistically distinguishable regional distribution in the frequency of intensity in conflict.

Table 7. Region and Intensity of Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Collision</th>
<th>Confrontation</th>
<th>Latency</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Africa</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pearson ( \chi^2 = 5.632 )</strong></td>
<td><strong>Prob. = 0.060</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

According to Table 8, the United States participated in 10 out of 12 cases where PKO intervened at the latency level of conflict. However, the United States also participated in 11 out of 26 cases where PKO intervened at the collision level. The distribution of cases in Table 8

Table 8. Intensity and U.S. Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intensity</th>
<th>Non-intervention</th>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collision</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confrontation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latency</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pearson ( \chi^2 = 5.632 )</strong></td>
<td><strong>Prob. = 0.060</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
appears to show that the United States intervenes more often in latency conflicts than in collision conflicts. However, this tendency is not supported by statistical evidence, since $\chi^2$ of the table is acceptable only at the level of 6 percent. While U.S. intervention is a critical variable in determining the success or failure of preventive diplomacy, it is not concerned with the level of conflict at intervention.

**Conclusion**

The concept of preventive diplomacy originated from the Cold War period. Nevertheless, it has been applied in security affairs since being recognized by major powers and international organizations as an important method of conflict management in the post-Cold War era. With this new security practice, discussion on the definition and theory of the concept has proceeded heatedly.

This paper has examined the definition and theory of preventive diplomacy, along with case studies. Preventive diplomacy is defined as the diplomatic actions used prior to the occurrence of conflicts. However, the case studies reveal that the definition of the concept hardly reflects the reality. This means that the concept of preventive diplomacy has some limitations in its application to empirical study. For this reason, this paper has taken as preventive diplomacy the PKO activities, which makes it possible to easily collect data and clearly identify the beginning of intervention and the number of participating actors.

In theoretical respect, this paper has focused on the factors for successful preventive diplomacy. The success factors presented by Lund include timing, multifaceted action, intervention of major powers, moderate leadership, and state autonomy.

For the empirical analysis, this paper selected three of Lund’s success factors which are relatively easy to operationalize. The first factor examined is timing. To operationalize the timing factor, the cycles of conflict were classified according to the three stages of development, i.e., latency, confrontation and collision. We examined whether or not PKO intervention at the low level of conflict was successful. The second factor is the intervention of major powers. For this, we examined whether or not the PKO activities led by the United States were successful. The
third factor is state autonomy. We distinguished between domestic and international conflicts to specify state autonomy. Domestic conflicts have little to do with state autonomy, whereas international conflicts mean that the counterpart in conflict has the autonomy of negotiation. The geographical region of each conflict was additionally included as a crucial factor.

From the analysis, we can conclude the following: First, timing is an important factor. PKO intervention was most successful at the latent level of conflict. This is understandable, because PKO does not resort to force and may be helpless in armed clashes. Second, intervention of major powers is also important. The intervention of the United States yielded a high rate of success. Third, state autonomy is not an important factor. Domestic conflicts and international conflicts showed no differences in the success of PKO. Fourth, geographical region proved to be an important factor. PKO was more effective in resolving the conflicts in Europe and South America. Lastly, there is no statistically significant correlation between the abovementioned success factors. This means that the factors are mutually independent, and that PKO can succeed where at least one condition for success is met. Indeed, the more the success factors coincide, the more successful the PKO. For example, a PKO activity led by the United States in a conflict at the latent level in Europe would be the most effective.

This research is inspired by Lund’s theory of preventive diplomacy. The case studies on the former Soviet republics, North Korea and East Timor requires us to draw from three of the five factors that Lund regards as necessary for successful preventive diplomacy. Geographical region is additionally included as a new factor. From the case studies, we can also conclude that PKO is the best subject for empirical research on preventive diplomacy. PKO and preventive diplomacy were originally mutually independent concepts, but since preventive diplomacy has now been conceptually expanded, PKO can be used to evaluate preventive diplomacy. Our research results will highlight the preconditions for successful Peacekeeping Operations as an important form of preventive diplomacy.
### Appendix World Conflicts and PKO (1989–2002)

**Collision (C) Confrontation (M) Latency (L) Termination of conflict (E)**

<table>
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