Confrontation or Compromise on the Korean Peninsula: The North Korean Nuclear Issue

Young Whan Kihl

North Korea’s announced IAEA withdrawal, on June 13, 1994, triggered the UN Security Council move to impose economic sanctions on North Korea. This, in turn, followed from North Korea’s replacing fuel rods at the Yongbyon experimental reactor in May, without IAEA inspectors present to determine whether plutonium was about to be extracted from the spent fuel. As the North Korean act of defiance prompted the Korean crisis, tension escalated and the danger of another Korean War increased in the summer of 1994. The crisis was defused, however, by the timely intervention and personal diplomacy of former US President Jimmy Carter who travelled to Pyongyang to arrange for a compromise settlement. The subsequent US-DPRK high-level talks in Geneva produced a 4-part agreement that will serve as a package deal of possible accommodation, although the ultimate resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue remains uncertain.

The essay examines the background of the 1994 Korean crisis and the nature of relationship between the IAEA and the DPRK as regards the NPT and safeguards accord obligations of North Korea. North Korea was clearly not in full compliance with the IAEA demand for on-site inspections of either declared or undeclared nuclear sites. Jimmy Carter’s “private” missions to Pyongyang are analyzed and his meeting with now-deceased North Korean President Kim Il Sung is detailed. The subsequent package deal, worked out at the Geneva talks, provides the basis of a compromise settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue. But the question remains as to how realistic and feasible it is for this arrangement of a quid-pro-quo resolution of the Korean conflict.

As diplomatic methods for settling international disputes, the article notes basic differences, first of all, between confrontation and accom-
modation as mutually exclusive approaches and ways of dealing with international conflict, as well as between compromise and accommodation. Attempts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue have alternated between confrontation and accommodation as a way of resolving the Korean conflict. Confrontation entailing a military showdown, possibly leading to war, has momentarily been replaced by talk of compromise and accommodation involving diplomatic negotiation and bargaining, in a game-like situation, which may well result in peace and stability. However, compromise that entails an act of concession and give-and-take trading is in general less stable and lasting than genuine accommodation that reflects the mutual recognition of rival interests and rapprochement.
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Confrontation and accommodation are mutually exclusive as methods of dealing with international conflict. Whereas confrontation clearly connotes tension escalation and military showdown, backed up with the use of force—or threat to use force, accommodation or compromise is a method of diplomacy aimed at pacific settlement of international disputes. The attempt to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue has gone through, alternated between, the separate stages of confrontation and accommodation as ways of resolving the Korean conflict. Whereas confrontation entails a military showdown possibly leading to war, compromise or accommodation involves diplomatic bargaining and negotiation, with a game-like situation, that has the possibility to result in peace and stability.¹

This essay will review the background of the 1994 Korean crisis and will evaluate how the process on the Korean peninsula began in confrontation but was turned toward compromise or accommodation. What explains the temporary reprieve of the Korean crisis? How realistic and how possible is the idea of settlement of the Korean conflict based on a quid-pro-quo resolution of the North Korean nuclear controversy? What is the future prospect of a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula

in the post–Cold War environment, reflecting the dynamics of both regional and global politics?

The Context of the 1994 Korean Crisis

As tension mounted on the Korean peninsula in the early summer of 1994, the possibility of another Korean War was openly debated in the media. It was during the Panmunjom meeting on March 19 that the North Korean negotiator (Pak Yong-su) walked out of the conference room after some highly inflammable “threatening” remarks to his Southern counterpart. In his statement, which was subsequently retracted by the North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, Pak overreacted: “Seoul is not far away from here. If a war breaks out, Seoul will turn into a fireball. . . . Mr. Song, you will never survive the war, either.”

North Korea’s Army Chief of Staff Choe Gwang, on April 8, denounced the US, Japan and South Korea for “engaging in a vicious attempt to provoke a war against us” and claimed that his army “will give them a decisive counterblow and annihilate them mercilessly.”

These bellicose and ominous postures created a chilling effect and atmosphere in South Korea. The Seoul government reacted with heightened defensive measures including intensified civil defense exercises throughout the land. The US Clinton administration also reacted by announcing, on March 21, that Patriot missiles would be sent to South Korea, in response to a request by US Korea Combined Forces Commander General Gary Luck, and that work would start on a UN resolution to apply economic sanctions on North Korea.

Pyongyang’s Suspected Nuclear Program

The 1994 Korean crisis was prompted by North Korea’s “suspected” nuclear weapons program. North Korea is known to have a rather


extensive and ambitious program of nuclear reactors, and has been reprocessing the spent fuel for possible weaponry use. According to the US Central Intelligence Agency report to the president in December 1993, North Korea had probably already produced one or two nuclear bombs.\(^5\) Therefore, the international community led by the United States has begun to address the danger of nuclear proliferation, and the challenge that North Korea poses internationally.

In 1985 North Korea signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but did not become party to the IAEA safeguard measures until January 1992. In the meantime, in 1989 North Korea extracted an unknown quantity of spent fuel from its five-MWe experimental reactor at Yongbyon, with an admission that a tiny amount of plutonium had been obtained from the facility of what it calls a radioactive chemical laboratory in the Yongbyon complex. Furthermore, the DPRK has additional reactors and reprocessing plants under construction which, when put into operation, would make North Korea a formidable nuclear power.\(^6\)

In 1992, under considerable international pressure, North Korea agreed to allow IAEA on-site inspections of its nuclear reactors. However, on March 12, 1993, Pyongyang suddenly reversed its stance by announcing that it was withdrawing from the NPT, thereby creating a crisis mood in the region. This unprecedented North Korean move enhanced the suspicion that North Korea, indeed, was engaged in the nuclear weapons program and that it wanted to hide evidence from international inspection.\(^7\)

On June 11, just one day before the announced withdrawal from the IAEA was to take effect, North Korea reversed its stance by announcing

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\(^5\) This classified assessment was supported by virtually all intelligence agencies but disputed by the State Department’s analysts. *New York Times*, December 26, 1993.


that it now decided to "suspend its withdrawal." This was timed with the calling of the high-level talks between the US and the DPRK in Geneva.

In the remainder of 1993, IAEA-DPRK negotiations were deadlocked over the access to two nuclear waste sites that North Korea refused to open on the ground that they were military bases. In late December, however, North Korea took a conciliatory gesture by permitting IAEA inspection activities to resume, including changing the film in the cameras installed to monitor the reactor activities. This was arranged through the US-DPRK channel in New York, via the DPRK diplomatic mission to the UN.

On March 3, 1994, for the first time in more than one year, North Korea allowed the IAEA to resume nuclear inspections, but once again, the North Koreans refused complete access to all declared and undeclared sites. Therefore, during the first half of 1994, North Korea continued to renege on its promise and agreement with the IAEA. By the eve of the May 1994 crisis no progress had been made on the front of on-site inspection.

**IAEA Withdrawal Triggers UN Sanctions**

The 1994 Korean crisis erupted with the North Korean official news agency report, on May 14, that it had begun replacing fuel rods at the Yongbyon experimental nuclear reactor without IAEA inspectors present to determine whether plutonium had been extracted from the spent fuel. On May 17, US Defense Secretary William Perry warned that North Korea was diverting fuel rods from its Yongbyon reactor into enriched plutonium production. Unless IAEA inspectors would be able to intercede, this would allow North Korea to build five or six new nuclear bombs over the next two years. On May 28, the UN team of inspectors decided to leave North Korea because its proposals for monitoring refueling the reactor were rejected.

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8 There is no reason why military bases should be excluded from international inspection. North Korea argued in 1992, during its talks on the nuclear issues with South Korea, that the military bases in the South should be open for on-site inspection.

The IAEA board of governors adopted a resolution, on June 10, invoking the first formal sanctions against North Korea for barring full inspections of its nuclear facilities. The IAEA director general Hans Blix, in a letter to the UN Security Council, reported that the continuity of the DPRK compliance with the NPT safeguards measures could not be guaranteed and that his team of inspectors was unable to verify that North Korea was diverting the spent fuel and reprocessing it. This IAEA measure cleared the way for the UN Security Council deliberation regarding possible measures for imposing sanctions on North Korea.

On June 13, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the IAEA in an act of defiance over the IAEA report to the UN Security Council. This was met, on June 14, by a joint pledge on the part of the US, South Korea, and Japan to impose sanctions against North Korea; the US also sought a mandatory arms embargo against North Korea as a first phase of sanctions. The UN Security Council met to consider the US-drafted resolution.

The Clinton administration decided to press for a two-stage sanctions against North Korea. If the Pyongyang government did not give IAEA inspectors access to its nuclear plants, this called for limited economic sanctions initially, to be followed by a total trade embargo. The DPRK Foreign Ministry reiterated its earlier statement that North Korea would consider the hostile acts of imposing economic sanctions tantamount to a declaration of war. Threatening rhetoric and gestures reached the point where the 1994 Korean crisis might, indeed, get out of hand and plunge the Korean peninsula into the tragedy of another hot war.

**The 1994 Crisis in Perspective**

What was the reason behind North Korea’s threatening war against South Korea in March 1994? Evidence shows that Pyongyang’s “war threat” of turning “Seoul into Sea of Fire” was a premeditated act based on a careful scenario. The North Korean delegate read a prepared text at a formal negotiating table in Panmunjom rather than making a spontaneous remark. The threat was, therefore, part of the psychological warfare directed against South Korean population. By making this war

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threat North Korea hoped to plant fear and anxiety among the South Korean people. It was also used to divide opinion in the South by polarizing it between hawks and doves and also by driving a wedge between the governments of South Korea and the US.

The threat of war was also directed toward its own population at home.

The regime wanted to strengthen domestic control. By putting the country on a semi-war footing, they were trying to overcome economic hardship and international isolation. In a time of difficulty, a population will typically stay unified and disciplined.

To go to war, from the military standpoint, makes little sense to North Korea. It is a foolish act to start a war that it could not win in the end, even if it could succeed in heightening tension. If North Korea really wanted war, they would have never mentioned the word "war" and would have taken a peace offensive, as they did before the Korean War of 1950–53.

Finally, the war threat and brinkmanship were used against the international community including the United States. It was apparent that the North Korean regime wanted to squeeze the maximum amount of concessions out of the US by using its nuclear card. In 1995 the NPT is scheduled to go through a revision. Since the US wants to maintain the existing NPT system, North Korea could raise the stakes higher and plunge the world into chaos by threatening to leave the IAEA. North Korea gambled that the US Clinton administration does not, and would not, want war. The threat to go to war, or to use force, was a strategic move that Pyongyang utilized in order to achieve its policy objective. Its strategic calculus was to maximize its security interest and also to extract the utmost concession from the US.\(^\text{11}\)

**The IAEA, the DPRK and the NPT**

The DPRK, as the rogue state with nuclear ambition, is clearly the culprit, inviting international condemnation and moves toward sanctions. The international community response to the North Korean nuclear challenge is conducted at two levels. The first is the multilateral

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\(^{11}\) Craig and George.
channel via the IAEA and the UN Security Council, and the second is the bilateral and region-wide dealings with North Korea led by the US via military and diplomatic pressure. The DPRK relations with the IAEA over on-site inspections will be recounted first in this section, to be followed later by the US-DPRK bilateral talks and negotiation to settle the North Korean nuclear issue.

Whereas the IAEA acts as an executive arm of the United Nations to carry out on-site inspection on nuclear safeguards, the UN Security Council is the decision-making body of the UN to adopt appropriate resolutions on matters of maintaining international peace and security. When and if the Security Council resolutions are not complied with, it has the power to recommend enforcement measures entailing sanctions and the use of force, as in the case of the Gulf War following the Iraqi aggression of Kuwait. Hence, the DPRK’s confrontation with the IAEA and the UN Security Council was a serious matter of fulfilling the DPRK’s legal obligations under the NPT and the UN Charter.

**IAEA Inspection of Suspected Nuclear Sites**

In September 1974 North Korea joined the IAEA for the purpose of receiving atomic power-related benefits that go with the membership. To improve its safety measures North Korea’s atomic reactor in Yongbyon, for instance, has been inspected by the IAEA since December 14, 1977. North Korea also received IAEA technical assistance on improving the facilities of uranium mining and enrichment in Pyongsan and Paekchon.

It was not until December 12, 1985, however, that North Korea joined the NPT at the urging of the former Soviet Union, from which it was receiving atomic-energy related technology and equipment. Six years later, on January 30, 1992, North Korea signed the IAEA FSA (full safeguard accord) that was required of all NPT members within eighteen months after admission into the NPT. North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly, on April 9, ratified the accord.

The IAEA guidelines (Document IFNCIRC/153) specify three separate stages and procedures for investigating the overall safety of the
member countries. First, a member state must prepare a list of facilities subject to inspection, and submit a design information report answering fifty-eight individual questions for each facility to be included in the list within two months. Second, the IAEA carries out a temporary inspection in order to cross-check the list with the facilities. Third, the IAEA will proceed with periodic inspections of facilities in accordance with the inspection schedule to be agreed with the respective member state.

In its initial report submitted on May 4, 1992, North Korea identified facilities at sixteen locations that are subject to an IAEA inspection. These included: two research reactors, one each in Yongbyon and at Kim Il Sung University, respectively. They also included nuclear fuel processing plant, a nuclear fuel storage facility, a five-MWe experimental nuclear reactor, radiochemical laboratory (under construction), a 50 MWe nuclear reactor (under construction), all of these in the Yongbyon complex; a 200 MWe atomic power plant (under construction) in Taechun; a uranium mine in Pyongsan; uranium refinery in Pyongsan; uranium refinery in Paekchon; and a 635 MWe atomic power plant (under construction) in Shinpo.

The IAEA team of inspectors, led by director general Hans Blix, visited North Korea's nuclear facilities from May 11 to 16, 1992, followed by the first temporary inspections from May 25 to June 6. An auxiliary agreement on nuclear inspection procedures was signed, on July 10, 1992, between the IAEA and North Korea. A total of six inspection visits took place thereafter until February 1993, with the second (July 6–16), the third (September 1–15), the fourth (November 2–12), the fifth (December 14–22) and the sixth (January 26–February 6, 1993).

As the IAEA on-site inspections progressed, questions and discrepancies began to emerge. For instance, North Korea stated in its initial report to the IAEA that, in 1990, a tiny amount of 90 grams of plutonium had been extracted from its experimental reactor in


13 Ibid.
Yongbyon. However, a discrepancy resulted from the analysis of samples taken during the IAEA’s inspections: at least three times of the reported amount were shown in the initial analysis. North Korea claimed that an IAEA technical error in calculation was possibly the reason, but the IAEA demanded that North Korea comply with full explanation, within a month. The IAEA proceeded with an assumption that North Korea was hiding evidence of additional plutonium extracted from the experimental reactor.

**National Security, Sovereignty and Legal Loophole**

The IAEA-DPRK controversy subsequently became deadlocked with the North Korean charge that the IAEA was not fair, biased against North Korea. The IAEA demanded access to two unreported facilities in the Yongbyon nuclear complex which subsequently became known via satellite photography undertaken by US military operations early in 1993.

This information, relayed to the IAEA by the US government, was condemned by North Korea as in violation of its sovereignty and national security. A heated verbal battle ensued between the IAEA and North Korea over the incidence of obtaining a satellite photographic evidence. The IAEA demanded a special inspection in February 1993 of two facilities that might be hiding the waste from the plutonium extraction. North Korea, however, claimed that these were military facilities that had nothing to do with nuclear development. It refused the IAEA demand on the ground that the IAEA was acting on behalf of a third country, the US, and that it was unfair for the IAEA to demand an unprecedented special inspection only of North Korea.

Since it was difficult for North Korea to refute the IAEA position, Pyongyang declared its intention to withdraw from the NPT on March 12, 1993, although it reversed this stance on June 11, on the eve of the US-DPRK high-level talks. In so doing it invoked the provision of the NPT that recognizes the right to withdraw on the ground of “the extraordinary events...having jeopardized its supreme interests.” According to the NPT Article 10, section 1, “[E]ach Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject
The IAEA-DPRK stalemate persisted until May 1994, when North Korea acted to sabotage the IAEA inspectors in North Korea by accelerating the refueling of the reactor in Yongbyon. North Korea defended its act on reasons of safety, that the fuel rods of the reactor had to be replaced on time, although it did so without the presence of the IAEA inspectors who wanted to take samples. It also proceeded on legal grounds, reflecting its claim of sovereignty, that nothing in the NPT treaty and the IAEA safeguard accord would prevent it from exercising its sovereign power.

In defense of its act, the DPRK charged that the IAEA was not impartial. It pointed out that because other countries such as Japan were already engaged in IAEA-monitored plutonium extraction that North Korea should have the same right as others. Why is it that Japan is allowed to do so by the IAEA and without US objection, they asked.

The DPRK, therefore, decided to go ahead with separating plutonium from the spent fuel even with or without IAEA inspectors present. In this sense the IAEA allows a legal loophole. The fact is that all the advanced states, subject to IAEA inspection, are allowed to pursue breeder reactors and other plutonium-using technologies, so long as IAEA inspectors are present to monitor. The only catch is that in reprocessing the spent fuel extracted the plutonium will not be diverted for use in weapons. This is the point that North Korea wanted to keep secret. Therefore, for political and strategic reasons, the DPRK will continue to resist the international pressure and will object to the transparency rule of its nuclear program.

North Korea's unexpected IAEA withdrawal announcement, the first of its kind, took the international community by surprise. It also raised the question of how effective the IAEA is as an inspection regime with

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16 Ibid.
broader implications for the viability of the NPT as an international regime for nuclear safeguards.

The year 1995 is the time of revising the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. According to Article 10, section 2, of the NPT, signed in 1968 but became effect on March 5, 1970, “Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties of the Treaty.” The hour of decision on the NPT revision is rapidly approaching and the DPRK knows that others are apprehensive.

The DPRK has judged that the US, as one of the key and founding members of the NPT, cannot afford to see a country like North Korea sabotage and undermine the effort to save the structure by reforming the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. This is the reason behind the DPRK’s using its bargaining chip to seek direct access to the US.

Pyongyang has used both formal and informal channels in its attempt to promote what it calls “a package deal.” Pyongyang clearly wants to use the nuclear issue as leverage or a bargaining chip in its negotiation with the US on a host of security and political issues. North Korea relies on a strategy of linkage of issues. The June 1994 Jimmy Carter’s Pyongyang trip, therefore, can be examined from the broad perspective of the DPRK’s strategic and political calculation.

**Jimmy Carter’s Back-Channel Diplomacy**

The international response to the North Korean nuclear challenge was also conducted at the bilateral level, and in the regional context, led by the United States in consultation with its allies in the region, South Korea and Japan. Before recounting the official channel of how the US-DPRK high-level talks were conducted in 1993–94, the episode of Jimmy Carter’s personal diplomacy should be explained, with a view to placing the success or failure of Carter’s Pyongyang mission in its proper perspective and context of the 1994 Korean crisis.

By the end of the summer 1994 the danger of a second Korean War was somehow averted. This was largely a result of the effort of former
US President Jimmy Carter and his successful four-day mission to Pyongyang on June 15–18. The Clinton administration, on June 15, decided to allow North Korea a grace period in drafting its Security Council resolution, to settle its dispute over international nuclear inspections, before the first stage of mild UN sanctions would take effect. However, on June 16, China rejected a US draft resolution calling for UN sanctions against North Korea over the nuclear issue.

“Private” Mission to Pyongyang?

Although Jimmy Carter’s trip to Pyongyang was touted as a “private” mission, his status and prestige as a former US president clearly carried weight and produced an impact on the Bill Clinton administration. It is not conceivable, therefore, that there had been no prior consultation and coordination between the two presidents regarding the diplomatic initiative to be undertaken by Jimmy Carter. For this reason Carter’s trip to Pyongyang can be taken as providing a second track and back door channel diplomacy to the US official government policy toward North Korea.

As the Korean crisis erupted in 1994, Jimmy Carter was concerned about the danger that the conflict could escalate into a full-scale war over the North Korean nuclear issue. He was particularly concerned about “the apparent lack of an avenue of communication with the top leader of North Korea,” Kim Il Sung. Carter was convinced that Kim was “the only one who could make the decisions to alleviate the crisis and avoid another Korean war.” With this in mind Carter initiated a call to President Bill Clinton about one hour before he was to depart for Europe, to participate in a ceremony marking the 50th anniversary of the Normandy landing in World War II. As Carter expressed his concern over the developing crisis with North Korea, President Clinton agreed to send someone to give a background briefing on the issue. This person turned out to be Robert Gallucci, assistant Secretary of State on military and security affairs, who came to Atlanta, Georgia, to brief Jimmy Carter.

17 Jimmy Carter, Report on Our Trip to Korea, June 1994. My information on Jimmy Carter’s activities on his trip to Korea is derived from this source and the newspaper coverage of his trip.
Carter. Gallucci also carries the rank of ambassador-at-large and served as chief US negotiator in the second US-DPRK high level talks.

Jimmy Carter, for several years, had a standing invitation to visit Pyongyang. He therefore initiated a call, one day after he spoke with President Clinton, to reconfirm his invitation to visit Pyongyang with the assurance that it was from President Kim Il Sung himself. Carter then called Vice President Al Gore informing that he was strongly inclined to accept the North Korean invitation. Carter was assured the next morning by Gore that President Clinton and his top advisors approved of his Pyongyang visit.

In the meantime Carter, in Atlanta, received a number of briefings from his own sources, including one from a nuclear engineer from Georgia Tech University and from a CNN news reporter who had recently been to North Korea. On Friday afternoon, June 10, Jimmy Carter flew to Washington, with his wife and his aide (Marion Creekmore) for additional briefings on the subject. On June 11 Carter reviewed all the information, wrote out his own itinerary for the trip, and then read them over to Ambassador Robert Gallucci who had no suggestions for changes.

Jimmy Carter left Atlanta on June 12, accompanied by his wife Rosalynn, Marion Creekmore and Dick Christenson of the US State Department acting as an interpreter. Except for official briefings that he received, Jimmy Carter was “without any clear instructions or official endorsement” from the US government. In effect, he was on his own, Carter claims.

Jimmy Carter arrived in Seoul on June 13, staying in US Ambassador James Laney’s official residence. He had talks with President Kim Young Sam the next day, and discovered that most of Kim’s top advisors seemed somewhat troubled about Carter’s planned visit to Pyongyang. The exception was deputy prime minister, Lee Hong-koo, who was in charge of reunification talks and, Carter says, was more positive and helpful with more objective views toward North Korea. Carter also

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18 Ibid. He later discovered, to his dismay, how some of the assessments of the US and North Korea experts differed sharply from his own subsequent observations at the site.

19 Ibid.
talked with US General Gary Luck, commander of the US-ROK Combined Forces, who said he was deeply concerned about the consequences of another Korean war. General Luck’s estimation, according to Carter, was that “the costs (of another Korean war) would far exceed those of the 1950s.”

**Jimmy Carter’s Meeting with Kim Il Sung**

From Seoul Jimmy Carter traveled to the truce village of Panmunjom and crossed the DMZ. He arrived in Pyongyang on June 15, and met with North Korean President Kim Il Sung on June 16 to open a round of talks aimed at easing the crisis.

Carter’s first day in Pyongyang obviously did not work out as well as expected. He had his first meeting with Kim Yong-nam, Pyongyang’s foreign minister, but their discussion did not go very far toward the resolution of conflict. In response to Carter’s proposal on how to end the impasse, Kim Yong-nam told him that convening a third round of US-DPRK talks was a prerequisite to any affirmative move by North Korea. Carter also realized that the threat of sanctions would get nowhere because the North Koreans considered it an “insult, branding North Korea as an outlaw nation and their revered leader as a liar and criminal.” The foreign minister’s comments, although moderate in tone, seemed to Carter as if “they would go to war rather than yield to international condemnation and economic pressure.”

As he was somewhat distressed, Carter woke up in the middle of the night to ponder what he should do next. In the absence of instructions or authority from his government, Carter decided to send Marion Creekmore to Panmunjom with a mission. His instruction was to send a secure message from South Korea to Washington of the situation, and also to seek authorization from President Clinton to propose a third round of talks so as to defuse the crisis.

On June 16, Carter met the North Korean President Kim Il Sung. To his surprise Carter found Kim Il Sung “to be vigorous, alert, intelligent, and remarkably familiar with the issues.” Although Kim consulted

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.
frequently with his advisors, including Foreign Minister Kim, Vice Foreign Minister Song Ho-kyong, and First Vice Minister Kang Sok-ju, it was clear to Carter who was in full command and who made the final decisions. Kim thanked Carter for his accepting this three-year old invitation, but asked that Carter speak first.

Carter described his “unofficial role,” the briefings that he received, his visit with South Korean President Kim Young Sam, before presenting the position that he carefully prepared before leaving Atlanta. He outlined the entire situation as he saw it in a way Kim Il Sung would be fully aware of “all concerns about North Korean nuclear policies.” On occasion, Kim would nod or ask Carter to pause while he talked to his advisors. Dick Christenson, Carter’s State Department interpreter, later reported that Kim Il Sung was obviously not thoroughly briefed on “one important problem: IAEA inspectors being expelled.”

Kim Il Sung, in effect, accepted all of Carter’s proposals, with two major requests. First was that the US support Pyongyang’s acquisition of light-water reactor technology, realizing that the funding and equipment could not come directly from the US. The second was that the US guarantee no nuclear attack against North Korea. All the outstanding nuclear issues, Kim insisted, could be resolved at the third round of US-DPRK talks to be resumed. During the talks, he was willing to freeze their nuclear program and to consider a permanent freeze if their aged reactors could be replaced with modern and safer ones.22

Carter assured Kim Il Sung, in turn, that there were no nuclear weapons in South Korea or tactical weapons in the waters surrounding the Korean peninsula, and that the US intention was to see North Korea acquire light-water reactors. Both leaders agreed that the Korean peninsula should be made nuclear-free. Now that Carter was able to get the North Korean commitment, he had Dick Christenson call Marion Creekmore to tell him to return to Pyongyang without sending his message to Washington.

When Jimmy Carter called Robert Gallucci from Pyongyang, on an open line, to report the apparent agreement with the North Korean leader, he was told that a high-level meeting was in progress in the

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22 Kim Il Sung told Carter that Brezhnev had promised a 2,000 MWe reactor to North Korea in the late 1970s, but Chernenko subsequently defaulted on this promise.
White House and that his report would be discussed. After telling Gallucci his plan to give CNN an interview, although promising to refrain from speaking for the US government, Carter from Pyongyang said that the North now agreed not to expel international inspectors, as long as “good-faith efforts” were made to resolve dispute. He was later contacted by Anthony Lake, Clinton’s National Security Advisor, to clarify certain points and to go over a statement that the US government was proposing to make.

On June 17, Jimmy Carter in Pyongyang announced that the Clinton administration now was “ready to suspend the UN sanctions effort.” He met Kim II Sung again, on June 17, for three and a half hours on a yacht sailing on the Taedong River. He told the North Korean leader that Washington “provisionally agreed” to a third round of high-level talks with Pyongyang to discuss, among other points, the light-water reactor issue requested by North Korea. In reaction to this claim, President Clinton said to a reporter while visiting Chicago that “nothing has changed” in his policy of pursuing UN economic sanctions against North Korea.23

**Impact of Carter’s Mediatory Role**

One of Jimmy Carter’s accomplishments from his Pyongyang mission was his mediatory role between South and North Korea. Upon his return to Seoul, on June 18, Jimmy Carter conveyed a message from Kim II Sung to South Korean President Kim Young Sam. Carter related that the North Korean leader was willing to meet the South Korean president “anywhere, at any time and without any conditions.” Although the proposal sounded more like a propaganda ploy, it was identical to what Kim Young Sam had already proposed during his presidential campaign in December 1992. The South Korean President Kim accepted the proposal immediately.24

As a gesture of good faith North Korea, on June 21, extended the visas of two IAEA nuclear inspectors, allowing them to continue monitoring the refueling of its reactor. As the Korean crisis was defused

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by the Carter's Pyongyang visit, the Clinton administration, on June 22, also announced that the third US-DPRK high-level talks would be held in Geneva on July 8.\textsuperscript{25}

As a follow-up to Carter's mediation on the North-South Korean summitry, preliminary talks were held in Panmunjom regarding the details of the proposed Korean summit. On June 28 the two sides sent their delegates of deputy prime ministerial ranks which agreed that the first summit would be held on July 25–27 in Pyongyang. On July 1, delegates from both sides held a working-level meeting at Panmunjom to settle procedural matters related to the forthcoming summit. They agreed to hold at least two one-on-one summit sessions with only a handful of minister-level officials. The two sides also agreed that 100 South Korean officials and 80 journalists would accompany President Kim Young Sam.\textsuperscript{26}

The unexpected death of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung on July 8, however, led to an indefinite postponement of the first-ever, historical summit between North and South Korea. On July 8 the third US-DPRK high-level talks in Geneva also convened, but the meeting was suspended until a later date as the DPRK delegation returned to attend the funeral for Kim Il Sung. The meeting was subsequently resumed, August 5–13, producing a four-part preliminary agreement, to be noted in the subsequent section.

Clearly, the Carter visit to Pyongyang gave North Korea an opportunity to reconsider its hardened stance and priority. In the face of an impending UN Security Council resolution on imposing economic sanctions, North Korea needed a face-saving device for reversing its bellicose, hardline position on the nuclear issue. Before crossing the line of "no return" on the question of war or peace, North Korea clearly hesitated and blinked in its showdown of force with the United States. It thus retreated from the brinkmanship position in confrontation with the United States.

The significance of the Carter's mediatory role is that his Pyongyang visit put the brakes on the downward spiral of the 1994 Korean crisis, ever since the reactor fuel imbroglio in May triggered the crisis. It was

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., June 22, 1994.

\textsuperscript{26} Interview with Lee Hong-koo, Seoul, July 8, 1994.
fortunate because Carter prompted Kim Il Sung to commit to keeping IAEA inspectors at DPRK nuclear facilities; he also carried back a list of DPRK offers to the United States.

The key factor influencing Kim Il Sung was an apparent divergence between Carter and Clinton over the efficacy of sanctions. This enabled Carter to maintain his own credibility in both the United States and in the DPRK. Kim Il Sung perceived that Carter was not simply an emissary of Clinton.27

Carter’s visit also indicated to the DPRK that the view of Seoul hereafter would play a lesser role in American moves. This was a factor that had increased the DPRK’s desire to have Carter visit in the first place. The same logic may work again when and if Carter decides to accept an invitation to revisit North Korea.28

Carter’s Pyongyang visit made the Seoul government nervous and initially was strongly opposed by Seoul. Many expressed the concern that Carter might easily fall victim to the hypnotizing ploy of the North Korean leader. One commentator, for instance, wrote that Carter “was too quick in his assessment of Kim Il Sung” when he stated, during a press conference in Seoul, that he found Kim Il Sung to be “vigorous, intelligent and, above all, surprisingly well informed” about the somewhat complicated nuclear issues. The fact that former US president would come up with such a definite assessment, after seeing a person for only several hours, was considered shocking.29

**US-DPRK Talks and Negotiation**

The US-DPRK confrontation, precipitated by the reactor fuel imbroglio of May 1994, was eased by Carter’s successful “personal diplomacy.” One tangible accomplishment of Carter’s Pyongyang mission was to call for the third US-DPRK high level talks in Geneva, July 8–9 and August 5–13, 1994. What difference, if any, did this meeting


28 The possibility of Carter’s revisit to Pyongyang, and Seoul, was openly mentioned in the newspaper. See for instance, *Hanguk Ilbo*, September 23, 1994.

make in resolving North Korea’s nuclear issue? How should we characterize the bargaining of the Geneva talks and its accomplishments? Was it an act of compromise or accommodation? Was it Carter’s trip to North Korea itself that led to a kind of breakthrough on the 1994 Korean crisis? Was that trip closer to compromise and appeasement? Or was it a genuine positive step toward the final resolution of the Korean conflict based on accommodation?

There is a basic difference between compromise and accommodation as diplomatic tools and methods for settling international disputes. Both approaches clearly rest on the assumption of seeking peaceful alternatives to war and conflict. Whereas compromise is clearly a more direct and unobtrusive form of settlement, accommodation is a more deliberate and public form of international dispute settlement.30

Both compromise and accommodation, to be successful, must start from the premise of striking a deal and obtaining a quid-pro-quo resolution of conflict. Accommodation is a clean and clear resolution, based on the mutual recognition of rival interests; compromise is likely to be less clean and clear because it often entails a concession and trading of give-and-take. Both of these methods ultimately are a political act. Compromise and concession are often criticized by purists as acts of appeasement and unnecessary giving-in to the opponent, even if the payoff of settlement may be so much more tangible as not to be dismissed lightly.31

The Logic of Accommodation

Strategic calculus was the deciding factor behind the 1994 crisis eruption, to begin with, and so was the attempt to resolve the conflict, whether it was via informal, as in Pyongyang, or official channels of diplomacy, as in Geneva. Both sides of the dispute were engaged in the
task of advancing their security interests. This aspect of reliance on the strategic calculus was clearly evident, especially in the conduct of the high level-talks in Geneva in 1993–94.

As a strategic move, the US continued to involve the UN for possible sanctions as if no change via Carter’s mediatory role had happened. The US increased the pressure on the DPRK to conform with its demands, and that of the UN Security Council and the IAEA. The US also reiterated its official position, with an assurance that the door was still open for the DPRK to walk through at any time, while taking time to clarify exactly what North Korea had meant by its declarations to Carter.

From the US perspective the ingredients of a compromise settlement were finally placed on the table. The Carter mission succeeded in extracting a significant concession from North Korea. The DPRK now hinted that it would trade away its reprocessing plant if conditions were right. It would also put its construction program for 50 and 200 MWe plutonium production reactors on hold. The fact that these two items were now on the table indicated to the US negotiator that the DPRK was putting all its cards on the table. Restoring full scope safeguards was the only unsettled matter from the US point of view. Therefore, the Clinton administration had to move rather quickly to strike a deal. Timing is always an important variable in successful bargaining.

Once this break in the ice jam began, the possibility of a breakthrough settlement of the nuclear issue based on quid-pro-quo or win-win formula began to emerge. Why is this a sign of sudden breakthrough besides the obvious fact of Carter’s mediatory role? What was the logic of a dramatic settlement on the North Korean nuclear issue?

Since Jimmy Carter’s successful mediation in June, there has come a convergence of mutual interests between the two sides. The US interest clearly lies in stopping North Korea’s extraction of plutonium by reprocessing spent fuel, while the DPRK had a series of demands on its shopping list. These included: US negative security guarantee, i.e., the US will not initiate nuclear attack against North Korea, US guarantee for North Korean acquisition of light-water reactor technology, US guarantee for North Korea’s fuel needs to be met in the interim period until the light-water reactors are put into operation, and the establish-

32 Fisher and Ury, ibid.
ment of a liaison office toward an eventual US-DPRK diplomatic normalization down the road. These are all substantive demands by North Korea that, if fully met, will give them tangible benefits and rewards for having played the nuclear card with skill and tact.

**Analysis of the “Win-Win” Propositions**

The North Korean strategy in achieving these objectives was to conduct direct talks with the US. It wanted to strike a package deal with the US on a host of issues as preconditions for resolving the nuclear issue. North Korea also wanted to bypass both South Korea and the IAEA in its deals with the US on the nuclear matters.

The US strategy, on the other hand, was to pressure and persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambition, by modifying its program away from weaponry development toward the peaceful use of atomic energy. To achieve this objective, the US position all along has been to involve the IAEA in the process of verifying the present and past history of Pyongyang’s nuclear industry.

Whereas North Korea proposed a “package deal” to settle the nuclear issue, the US was not willing to accept it, unless the nuclear safeguards issue was settled first. It then suggested that the next stage of political settlement, including an eventual diplomatic normalization, would naturally follow. An important reason why the US was reluctant to make a political settlement with North Korea was also due to the alliances that the US maintains with South Korea and Japan. The US had to coordinate its policy change with allied countries.

In the end a compromise was struck between the North Korean and the US versions of respective proposals. The third high level talks, in 1994, thus, show the desire to attain a compromise settlement that reflects at least the public positions already articulated in 1993. At the end of the second round of the second US-DPRK talks in Geneva, on July 19, 1993, a joint statement was issued on a three-points agreement, thereby setting the benchmark for the subsequent US-DPRK talks and negotiation in 1994.

Prior to the breakthrough agreement on August 13, 1994, there were two prior US-DPRK high-level talks held. The first was held in New York in January 1992 attended by US Assistant Secretary of State Arnold Kanter and North Korean Workers’ Party secretary Kim Yong-
soon. This talk provided the forum for airing each official position and for discussing a wide range of issues of mutual concern between the two countries. However, it did not provide any tangible agreement. Nor was there any follow-up meeting between the two countries.

The second US-DPRK high level talks took place in 1993 to discuss the nuclear issue. Two rounds of meetings in 1993 were held, the first in New York City, June 9–11, and the second in Geneva, July 16–19. It was at the end of the second round of the talks that a joint statement was issued on a three-point agreement. These were that (1) North Korea would begin talks with the IAEA to discuss the question of outstanding safeguards, that is, over special inspections; (2) that inter-Korean talks would be reopened to discuss matters of mutual concern, including the nuclear issue, and (3) that a third round of high-level talks would be held within two months to discuss possible US assistance for North Korea to replace existing graphite-moderated reactors with light-water reactors. Because of lack of progress on the first two items, however, the third-round talks did not take place on time. Despite lack of progress, Jimmy Carter in Pyongyang informed Kim Il Sung that the Clinton administration was now willing to hold such a bilateral talks.

The third US-DPRK high level talks was more substantive in discussion and successful in producing concrete agreement that were substantively important enough to serve as the benchmark for the subsequent US-DPRK negotiation. The third meeting was held in Geneva on July 8, 1994, but suspended on July 9 because of the announced death of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung on July 8. As the talks were resumed on August 5, they reached a breakthrough agreement on August 13 on steps to ease nuclear tensions and to establish liaison offices in each other’s capital, with further talks scheduled for September 23 in Geneva.

A four-point joint statement reaffirmed the principles of the June 11, 1993, US-DPRK joint statement. The four specific elements that constitute an integral part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue were

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33 [For the complete text of this agreement, see Peter Hayes, this issue of the KJDA, p. 217.]
then identified in their agreement. These were substantively important as to merit a detailed listing.36

First, the DPRK promises “to replace its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactors (LWR) power plants,” and the US is prepared “to make arrangements for the provision of LWRs of approximately 2,000 MWe to [North Korea] as early as possible” and “to make arrangements for interim energy alternatives to the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors.” Upon receipt of US assurances for the provision of LWRs and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will then “freeze construction of the 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors, forgo reprocessing, and seal the radiochemical laboratory, to be monitored by the IAEA.”

Second, the US and the DPRK are prepared “to establish diplomatic representation in each other’s capital and to reduce barriers to trade and investment, as a move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.”

Third, to help achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, the US is prepared “to provide the DPRK with assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the US,” and the DPRK remains prepared “to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.”

Fourth, the DPRK is prepared “to remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.”

In addition, both sides agreed that expert-level discussions were necessary to advance the replacement of North Korea’s graphite-moderated program with LWR technology, the safe storage and disposition of the spent fuel, provision of alternative energy, and the establishment of liaison offices. Accordingly, both sides agreed that expert-level talks be held in the US and the DPRK, or elsewhere, as agreed, and that they would recess their talks but resume in Geneva on September 23, 1994.37

In the subsequent press conference held early August 12, at North Korea’s mission to the UN in Geneva, US chief negotiator Robert L.


37 Craig and George, ibid.
Gallucci stated that "...the agreement that we reached...we both regard as a very useful one, one that advances objectives that we both share" and that "there are many important issues that remain to be resolved." The North Korean negotiator Kang Sok-ju, in turn, said in Korean that "...the agreement we have reached is a weighty and significant document" and that "we will freeze our graphite-moderated nuclear power plants, [while] we will be given alternatives for an interim period before we get the light-water reactor." He added that "[T]his is most important and essential element in resolving the so-called nuclear issue."39

Two separate meetings of experts were subsequently held, in Pyongyang on the question of establishing liaison missions and in Berlin on the question of light-water reactor construction. The second round of the third US-DPRK high level talks were then held in Geneva, from September 23 to October 17, 1994, to make further progress before finalizing and implementing the four-point agreement already reached. After seeking further consultation with their home governments, while the technical-level meetings were still going on in Geneva, delegations of both sides met on October 21 to sign an "Agreed Framework between the US and the DPRK." The agreement states that both sides (1) "will cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with the light-water reactor-power plants," (2) "will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations," (3) "will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula," and (4) "will work together to strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime."40

As regards the first point, the US agreed, "in accordance with the October 20 letter of assurance" written by US President Bill Clinton, to "make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of a LWR project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MWe by a target date of 2003" and, for this purpose, to "organize under its leadership an...

39 Ibid.
international consortium to finance and supply the LWR project to be provided to the DPRK.” The US also agreed to “make arrangements to offset the energy foregone due to the freeze of the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, pending completion of the first LWR unit,” and to provide the DPRK, during this interim period of energy needs, with the supply of 500,000 tons annually of heavy oil for heating and electricity production purposes. The DPRK agreed, as these conditions are met, “to freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities . . . within one month of the date of this Document” by allowing the IAEA to monitor this freeze. Dismantlement of the graphite-moderated reactors, however, will not be completed until the LWR project is completed. On the question of disposal of the spent fuel from the 5MWe experimental reactor, the DPRK agreed to cooperate with the US in finding a method to store [it] safely during the construction of the LWR project, and to dispose the fuel in a manner that does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK.”

On the remaining points, both sides agreed to “reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions,” and to “upgrade bilateral relations to the ambassadorial level” as works of liaison offices make progress. To realize a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, the US agreed to “provide formal assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the US” while the DPRK agreed to “take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” and, for this purpose, to “engage in North-South dialogue.” The DPRK also agreed to “remain a party to the NPT” and to comply with the IAEA safeguards obligations. Finally, on the question of verifying the DPRK’s “past” nuclear reactor activities, the DPRK agreed to “come into full compliance” with the IAEA requirements “when a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components.”

An appendix to the agreement was also attached to provide further technical details of the agreement. This agreement uses no explicit words of “special inspection” but the DPRK’s “full compliance with (the IAEA) safeguards” include “taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completedness of the DPRK’s
initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.” The agreement reportedly contains certain secret protocols, but such contents have not been made public.41

**Prospect of the Korean Conflict Settlement**

The future prospect of US-DPRK negotiation on the nuclear issue, based on the Geneva agreement, is uncertain. Unlike the IAEA-DPRK multilateral negotiation, the US-DPRK bilateral talks made certain progress, it is true. But this was due, primarily, to the timely intervention by Jimmy Carter. Although the US-DPRK bilateral talks made certain progress, its success depends on fostering of mutual trust which is yet to be tested. The IAEA-DPRK multilateral negotiation, moreover, has reached the point of mutual distrust rather than working relationship that is essential for the successful implementation of the IAEA safeguards.42

**How Viable is Quid-Pro-Quo Resolution of the Nuclear Issue?**

Despite the difficulty in conducting negotiation in a multilateral diplomatic forum, it is important that the progress also be made in the IAEA-DPRK level. Without the success in the multilateral front, in connection with the IAEA on-site inspections and the DPRK's full compliance with the IAEA safeguards requirements, the US-DPRK agreement will remain hollow and meaningless. So far the nuclear conflict has been well managed, but it is premature to celebrate the breakthrough based on compromise because the ultimate test comes when and if the DPRK complies with the nuclear safeguard regulations within the context of IAEA activities.

A multilateral framework for the US-DPRK relations is also important if the terms of agreement are to be carried out successfully. Realizing the first point of agreement on the light-water reactor con-

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41 The existence of 'confidential minutes' attached to the agreement, as part of the settlement, was noted by Robert Gallucci during his press conference in Geneva on October 21, 1994. Also, for the text of Carter's letter of assurance to North Korea's Kim Jong-il, see NPR Daily Report, November 3, 1994.

42 Gallucci, speaking at the Foreign Press Center on October 27, 1994, characterized the framework agreement based not on "trust" but on "verification." See NPR Daily Report, October 28, 1994.
struction will depend on the smooth relationship between the DPRK and an international consortium, to be established for the purpose of financing and providing an appropriate technology to North Korea's needs. Unless and until the DPRK proves by words and deeds that it is willing and able to work within the multilateral framework of the international consortium, even if it is underwritten by a US guarantee, the successful implementation of the Geneva agreement on the light-water reactor construction may not work well.

US-DPRK high-level talks in Geneva almost failed due to a reported deadlock over the old issues and new problems arising from North Korea's demands. Difficulty arose over the questions of (1) whether South Korea will be allowed to participate in the international consortium as a key member over North Korea's strenuous objection, (2) whether North Korea will allow IAEA special inspections at two "suspected" nuclear waste sites, in a clear reversal of its earlier indication of concession, and (3) whether the US will go along with North Korea's new demand for compensation, by providing $2 billion, in cash, to buy out Pyongyang for what it has already invested in the construction of new reactors and "reprocessing" facilities.43

Although these negotiation talks were depicted by US chief negotiator Robert Gallucci as "serious and business-like" and "business-like and serious," there are bound to be new obstacles and a danger of the Geneva agreement not succeeding due to North Korea's new and changing expectations as well as changes in domestic political support both at home in the US and among its allies of South Korea and Japan.

**Lessons of the Korean Case**

Now that the North Korean nuclear challenge is successfully met and contained, within the framework of both IAEA and an international consortium for providing North Korea with light-water reactor construction, it is high time to draw some lessons from the case study of the North Korean nuclear crisis. What appropriate lessons can we learn from the 1994 Korean crisis and its successful resolution?

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Major lessons and findings of the Korean case may be broadly stated, in three areas, as follows:

First, as regards the behavior of North Korea as a surviving Leninist state:

- Confrontation breeds the ground for either war or peace.
- When Pyongyang is pressed to defend itself from an external threat, the logic of nuclear brinkmanship and regime survival sets in.
- To disguise its sense of insecurity, the regime promotes extreme forms of brinkmanship, with hyperbolic language of threat and intimidation followed by a more tenable act of bargain.
- It remains a mystery as to why North Korea used the rhetoric of "war threats and intimidation" against South Korea in the summer of 1994. But the fact is that North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT, in 1993, and the IAEA, in 1994, for mixed motives.

Second, as regards the controversy over North Korea's nuclear program:

- Nuclear nonproliferation continues to preoccupy the US as superpower in the post–Cold War environment of global politics. To achieve this objective the US is prepared to use dual-track diplomacy of bargaining with the nonnuclear weapon state. So long as North Korea adheres to the game of rational strategy, the logic of accommodation and interest convergence will set in to shape the bargaining process in US-DPRK negotiations.
- The impending reform of the NPT in 1995 gave North Korea a window of opportunity to play its nuclear card correctly to its advantage. This is why North Korea was able to extract concessions from the US directly, or indirectly, via other countries such as South Korea and Japan, in the form of greater financial payoffs and undiminished political gain.
- North Korea also adopted a negotiation strategy of linkage of the issues in an attempt to strike a package deal of compromised settlement.
- The IAEA is strong and viable so long as the member states are willing to abide by the international rules. If any member, such as North Korea, is determined to break away from the international regime, by blocking the IAEA's routine and special inspections,
the IAEA alone cannot force its will through without the support of the UN Security Council and General Assembly.

Third, as regards the broader issue of war and peace in the post–Cold War era:

- A small non-weapon state, such as North Korea, can to its advantage learn to play a nuclear strategic game of brinkmanship with the superpower.
- Diplomatic accommodation can still work as a technique of conflict settlement in the nuclear age. The resolution of conflict in the strategic realm, including nuclear crisis, can still proceed rationally, in post–Cold War global and regional politics.
- For nuclear diplomacy as a high-risk and high-stakes game to succeed, it must be based on military power and preparedness to back it up. The nuclear weapon states must be ready to go to war, if necessary, in order to defend national interest and strategic position. Credibility of the threat of retaliatory strike must be effective.

Finally, what is the future of accommodation and how viable is quid-pro-quo resolution of the nuclear issue? Despite the passing of the Cold War era globally, Korea has remained the last glacier and frontier of the Cold War battles primarily due to North Korea's ambitious nuclear development program. However, with the just-concluded settlement of the North Korean nuclear controversy, there is now greater prospect for maintaining peace and security on the Korean peninsula. The secret and key to the success are the diplomacy of accommodation, and reconciliation, based on the willingness to compromise and attain quid-pro-quo resolution of the conflict. In this age of transnational and inter-governmental bargaining, there is still room for personal diplomacy, which Jimmy Carter's successful mission to Pyongyang has so well demonstrated in defusing the 1994 Korean conflict.