This article develops a North-South Dual Triangular
Framework to explain how Northeast Asia’s Cold War security order was shaped by
the interaction of two coexisting triangles: ROK-U.S.-Japan and
DPRK-China-USSR. Rather than reducing these alignments to separate bilateral
ties or parallel alliance groupings, it conceptualizes triangular relations as
triadic strategic interactions in which third-party effects reshape dyadic
options, threat perceptions, and alliance bargaining. Drawing on neoclassical
realism, the study specifies a causal pathway in which external threats are
transmitted into the regional order as systemic structural pressure, which then
interacts with state-level perceptions, domestic constraints, and
alliance-management strategies to produce variation in triangular outcomes. The
framework integrates balance-of-threat and balance-of-interests logic: under
high structural pressure, triangular relations tend toward Coordinated Cohesion
or Selective Bilateral Cohesion depending on the degree of divergence in threat
perception; under low structural pressure, cooperation may become more
selective, bilateral, bargaining-driven, or relaxed rather than simply
disappearing. Comparative process tracing across three phases―1958-1968,
1969-1977, and 1978-1983―shows a persistent asymmetry. The southern triangle
repeatedly moved toward U.S.-coordinated cohesion through institutionalized
role-differentiation and crisis-management routines, while the northern
triangle more often produced Relaxation/Fragmentation or Selective Bilateral
Cohesion within fragmented alignment because of patronal fragmentation and
divergent threat priorities. The article concludes that contemporary
ROK-U.S.-Japan and DPRK-China-Russia dynamics should be understood through a
dual-triangle lens, but not as a simple restoration of Cold War bloc politics.
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